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DAVID ROSS QC! 
 
 
[This article examines the introduction of evidence by one accused of 
the criminal disposition of another in a joint trial.  Often such 
evidence is used by an accused to say that he did not commit the 
offence, the other accused did.  The evidence is also introduced to 
show duress.  
The article examines the relevance of such evidence and its 
justification.  Then it shows how the evidence is used in practice and 
what the appeal courts say about it.  The next part examines the 
different modes of such evidence and their different effects.  The last 
part examines the judge’s discretion to exclude such evidence in the 
setting of the need to conduct a fair trial and direct a jury properly.] 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In a trial of more than one accused the rule is that there are as many trials 
being conducted as there are accused.  In a trial of say two accused the 
prosecution will typically lead evidence implicating both, and other evidence 
which implicates each.  The defences of each are separate.  So generally 
where one accused introduces evidence showing the criminal disposition of 
the other, that evidence is relevant only to the case of the first accused.  It 
does not bear on the prosecution case for or against the other.  
 
One of the most frequent ways in which the criminal disposition of an accused 
will be introduced in evidence will occur when each accused denies being 
involved in any criminal activity but says the other was.  The other way in 
which such disposition is used is to show duress, that is that one accused 
forced the other to perform the act with which they are both charged. 
 
                                                          
! Barrister.  Admitted as silk throughout Australia and in Guyana. 
    DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                              VOLUME 11 NO 1  180
 
II RELEVANCE 
 
General principles of relevance never depend on some form of mathematical 
calculation.  The test for relevance is ‘logic and experience’.1  That is the 
logic and experience of the judge.  In Matthews, Schreiner JA said: 
 
Relevancy is based on a blend of logic and experience lying outside 
the law.  The law starts with this practical or commonsense relevancy 
and then adds material to it or, more commonly, excludes material 
from it, the resultant being what is legally relevant and therefore 
admissible.2 
 
Evidence of an accused’s propensity for wrongdoing is often excluded when 
the prosecution seeks its introduction.  That is not because the evidence lacks 
relevance.  Dawson J summed up the position in his opening remarks in 
Harriman: 
 
When a person is charged with a criminal offence, evidence is 
ordinarily inadmissible that he has on other occasions been guilty of 
behaviour indicating a criminal disposition.  This is not because the 
evidence is irrelevant.  On the contrary, it is excluded because a jury 
is likely to regard it as proving too much and is for that reason likely 
to proceed on prejudice rather than proof.3 
 
III JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER 
 
The justification for one accused adducing evidence of the bad character or 
criminal propensity of another is that no accused can be stopped from leading 
evidence relevant to a defence.  So it was that Mr McKenzie sought to 
introduce such evidence to show that he was coerced to play a small part in 
the crime because he was afraid of Mr Gibb who was a violent man.4 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729, 756 (Lord Simon); 
Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292, 297 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ).  
2 R v Matthews [1960] 1 SA 752, 758 (Appellate Division).  Approved (but wrongly 
cited): R v Harmer (1985) 28 A Crim R 35, 41; R v Fraser (1995) 65 SASR 260, 
267. 
3 Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590, 597. 
4 R v Gibb and McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155. 
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The entitlement of an accused to lead such evidence against a co-accused is 
well entrenched as relevant.  As the court said in Lowery and King: 
 
It is one thing to say that it is unjust or unfair for the Crown to put a 
person in danger of conviction by leading such evidence against him.  
It is, however, a very different thing to say that he is to be restricted in 
defending himself by excluding such evidence when it tends to rebut 
his guilt or to prove his innocence.5 
   
Hence the common law position is that evidence by one accused of the wrong 
behaviour of the other accused is prima facie relevant.  The Uniform Evidence 
Acts section 101(2) bear only on tendency evidence ‘adduced by the 
prosecution’.  Further, by section 111(1) the tendency rule does not apply to 
evidence ‘of an opinion about the defendant adduced by another defendant’.6  
Thus because such evidence is relevant it is admissible,7 or more correctly, 
not inadmissible. 8 
 
The leading of such evidence includes the cross-examination of prosecution 
witnesses.9  A judge should not prevent the leading of such evidence other 
than in the rarest of cases,10 nor confine or prevent cross-examination 
designed for the same purpose.11  
 
A judge may exclude prosecution evidence against one accused because it is 
too prejudicial.  But the other accused can compel its admission because it 
advances that other accused’s defence.12 
 
 
IV THE CUT THROAT DEFENCE 
 
Where there are two accused and each has a defence at odds with the other, 
one accused can lead evidence of the prior convictions of the other to show 
that the first accused’s version of events is the likely one.13 
                                                          
5 R v Lowery and King (No 3) [1972] VR 939, 947 (CCA) approved Lowery v The 
Queen [1974] AC 85, 102 (PC).  
6 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas). 
7 Uniform Evidence Acts s 56(1). 
8 Papaskomas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297, 306 [21]; Smith v The Queen (2001) 
206 CLR 650, 653 [6]. 
9 R v Miller (1952) 36 Cr App R 169 (ruling of Devlin J). 
10 R v Darrington and McGauley [1980] VR 353 (CCA). 
11 R v Gibb and McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155, 170-171 (CCA); R v O’Boyle (1991) 92 
Cr App R 202; R v Douglass (1989) 89 Cr App R 264. 
12 Question of Law Reserved (1998) 70 SASR 555. 
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It often happens in a joint trial that each accused says: ‘I am not the offender, 
the co-accused is.’  That form of defence has been called cut throat.  The 
expression may come from Turner.14  It was also used in Varley: ‘…this was a 
case where two experienced criminals metaphorically cut each other’s throats 
in the course of their respective defences.’15  It is certainly still in use in 
England.16  Whatever its origins, courts in Australia have taken to the 
expression.17  A good example of each accused blaming the other was 
Bannon.18  Two accused were convicted of the stabbing murder of two 
victims.  The prosecution was unable to say which was the principal but 
alleged that the other acted in concert or aided and abetted the principal.  The 
defence of each accused was that the other committed the crime, acting 
alone.19 
 
The recent decision of the House of Lords in Randall20 is a good example of 
the cut throat defence.  Mr Randall and Mr Glean were jointly charged with 
murder.  The prosecution case was that each of them acting independently or 
jointly inflicted fatal head injuries on the deceased.  Each had a motive.  Both 
accused gave evidence, each denying the fatal attack and blaming the other.  
Mr Randall introduced the propensity for violence of the other including the 
admission in evidence that at the time of the killing he was on the run from 
the police for a vicious and potentially brutal armed robbery.  But Mr Randall 
admitted having hit the deceased.  He was convicted and Mr Glean acquitted, 
rather undermining the observations of Dawson J in Harriman.  
 
Not always has such evidence been held admissible.  In Darrington and 
McGauley21 the accused were jointly charged with murder.  Mr McGauley’s 
defence was that he had agreed to the killing and had played no part in it.  Mr 
McGauley was prevented at trial from adducing evidence that Kaye 
Darrington had earlier killed someone else.  Jenkinson J, who gave the leading 
judgment, said that the trial judge did have a discretion to exclude such  
 
                                                                                                                                           
13 R v Douglass (1989) 89 Cr App R 264. 
14 R v Turner & ors. (1979) 70 Cr App R 256, 264. 
15 R v Varley (1982) 75 Cr App R 242, 246. 
16 R v Douglass (1989) 89 Cr App R 264. 
17 Kirby J uses the term extensively in R v Patsalis & Spathis (1999) 107 A Crim R 
432.  
18 Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1. 
19 In Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1997) (1998) 70 SASR 555 Perry J described 
the Bannon defences as cut throat.  Some other description might have been in 
better taste for in Bannon that was the cause of death. 
20 R v Randall [2004] 1 WLR 56; 1 All ER 467; 1 Cr App R 375. 
21 R v Darrington and McGauley [1980] VR 353 (CCA). 
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evidence and had properly exercised it.  He pointed out that the evidence was 
no part of the prosecution case against Ms Darrington and that the jury would 
be distracted by prejudice and complexity of issues from proper consideration 
of the case against her.22  His Honour went on to say that there were three 
reasons for a judge’s discretion to exclude such evidence. First, to relieve the 
jury of ‘intellectual and emotional burdens’.  Second, to reduce the need for a 
separate trial.  Third, where the weight of the proposed evidence is too 
slight.23  
 
These propositions call for some analysis.  True it is that two or more accused 
are tried together largely for procedural convenience.  But they are still 
considered separate trials.  On that basis his Honour’s point is sound.  So is 
the last point where a matter is so remote and difficult of proof that it is 
excluded.  The reference to the intellectual and emotional burdens on the jury 
seems like a voice from another age.  Since that decision we have often seen 
trials lasting more than six months, a scale expected by all participants.  As to 
the reduction of the need for a separate trial there is a paradox.  Trials are 
required to be as fair as possible. 
  
An accused cannot be shut out from a defence.  According to the House of 
Lords in Murdoch v Taylor, such rights are considered to be a fundamental 
interpretation of the statute and there is no room for a judge’s discretion.24  
That proposition has been applied and approved on too many occasions to 
cite.   
 
McBride25 was another case out of kilter with accepted principle.  Two 
brothers were jointly tried and convicted of murder.  They carried out an 
armed robbery on a post office in the course of which the postmistress was 
shot.  The applicant said there was no plan to use the firearm.  He also sought 
to introduce in evidence a letter later written by his brother showing that the 
brother was aggressive and sadistic and would kill for no reason.  The trial 
judge had rejected the evidence and the Court of Criminal Appeal agreed.  
They held that evidence of this sort cannot descend to the particular and must 
be confined to reputation and Lowery’s case must be limited by its own 
particular facts.26  These propositions have not since been referred to as far as 
I am aware. 
                                                          
22 R v Darrington and McGauley, 384.  
23 R v Darrington and McGauley, 385.  
24 Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574 (HL).  
25 R v McBride (1983) 34 SASR 433 (CCA). 
26 R v McBride , 443.  
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V THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
Most of the cases deal with whether there has been a miscarriage most 
particularly because the applications for separate trials were refused by the 
trial judge.  Nevertheless, through it all one can discern the sort of evidence 
that is led to show the criminal disposition of the other accused. 
 
In Miller27 the charge was conspiracy to import nylon stockings without 
paying customs duty. The other accused were Messrs Harris and Mercado.  
Mr Mercado’s defence was that he was not connected with the crime, and that 
Mr Harris, his employee, had posed as him and used his office for the purpose 
of the importation.  During the currency of what the prosecution said was the 
period of the conspiracy, Mr Harris had spent some time in prison.  No 
importations had occurred while he was there.  As part of his case, counsel for 
Mr Mercado cross-examined a prosecution witness on the fact of Mr Harris’s 
imprisonment.  The trial judge, Devlin J, ruled the evidence relevant (of 
course) and refused Mr Harris’s application for separate trial. 
  
In Holden the co-accused told the police of the fear he and others had of the 
accused because of what he had seen of Mr Holden’s violence and because of 
his reputation.  The evidence was held properly admitted.  The co-accused 
was acquitted of murder and manslaughter and Mr Holden convicted of 
murder.  His appeal was dismissed.28 
 
In Randall each accused gave sworn evidence.  Mr Glean admitted in cross-
examination by counsel for Mr Randall that he had committed offences of 
dishonesty and violence. The trial judge had warned the jury not to use the 
evidence of Mr Glean’s convictions as showing his likelihood of committing 
the offence.  The House of Lords examined many authorities including 
Darrington and McGauley and Gibb and McKenzie.  They unanimously 
agreed that the judge had misdirected the jury, dismissed the prosecution 
appeal and agreed with the Court of Appeal that Mr Glean have his conviction 
set aside and be granted a new trial. 
 
It is not unusual for one accused to tell the police about the violent propensity 
and reputation of another accused.  Mr Jones told the police about Mr 
Waghorn’s earlier criminal doings and provided a motive for Mr Waghorn’s 
commission of the murder.  At trial Mr Jones made an unsworn statement  
 
                                                          
27 R v Miller (1952) 36 C App R 169 (ruling of Devlin J). 
28 R v Holden (1990) 52 A Crim R 32 (SA CCA). Reference to Mr Holden’s 
propensity to violence is at 42-45. 
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reinforcing what he had told the police implicating Mr Waghorn.29  None of 
that evidence was admissible against Mr Waghorn.  Both were convicted of 
murder.  Mr Waghorn’s appeal succeeded and Mr Jones’s failed. 
 
VI DURESS 
 
In Gibb and McKenzie,30 JH Phillips QC appeared at trial for Mr Gibb.  The 
charge was murder.  Phillips QC did not appear on the appeal,31 but years 
later, as Phillips CJ, he described it and the evidential perplexities:   
 
There had been a joint trial of the two abovementioned accused (who 
were presented with one ‘C’) which had resulted in both Gibb and 
McKenzie being convicted.  ‘C’ was acquitted.  An application for 
separate trial for Gibb had been refused.  Gibb’s defence had been to 
raise an alibi but McKenzie and ‘C’, in unsworn statements, 
confirmed their and his presence at the death scene but pleaded that 
they acted under duress from Gibb.  This followed similar statements 
to the police, which were put in evidence. In addition, the unsworn 
statements and cross-examination of Crown witnesses produced a 
volume of damaging and prejudicial material against Gibb, which the 
Crown could not have led.32 
 
Note that the right of an accused to make an unsworn statement has now been 
abrogated by statute.33 
 
Collie, Kranz and Lovegrove34 were tried for murder along with a man named 
Meyer and a woman named Joanne Carter.  Joined in the same information 
but charged with misprision of felony was David Carter.  Mr Meyer and Ms 
Carter were acquitted but the rest were convicted.  Relevantly David Carter in 
conversations with police had implicated the convicted accused in the crime.   
 
 
                                                          
29 R v Jones and Waghorn (1991) 55 A Crim R 159 (Vic CCA). Smith J sets out that 
evidence at 181-183. 
30 R v Gibb and McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155 (CCA). 
31 I did. 
32 JH Phillips CJ, “Practical Advocacy” (1998) 72 Australian Law Journal 340. 
33 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 25; Qld Criminal Code s 618; WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 
97(2); Tas: Criminal Code s 371(c); NT: Criminal Code s 360; NSW: Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 s 31; Vic: Evidence Act 1958 s 25; SA:    Evidence Act 1929 s 
18A; ACT Evidence Act 1971 s 68A. 
34 R v Collie, Kranz and Lovegrove (1991) 56 SASR 302 (CCA). 
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He did not give evidence.  Mr Lovegrove’s statement to police implicated the 
others.  He gave evidence that because of delusions he could not recall his 
statements to police.  He was cross-examined and attributed his knowledge of 
what had happened by rumours implicating Messrs Collie and Kranz.  Each 
was convicted of murder.  The appeals were allowed. 
 
Mr Mathers was convicted of two counts of culpable driving causing death.  
His co-accused at trial was Mr Kavenagh.  The two deceased had been in Mr 
Kavenagh's car which he said was chased by Mr Mathers who had put him in 
fear.  By cross-examination of police, counsel for Mr Kavenagh elicited prior 
and subsequent convictions of Mr Mathers.  In an unsworn statement Mr 
Kavenagh told of his conversations with naval ratings like himself of violence 
visited on them.  Mr Mathers fitted their description of their assailant.  Mr 
Kavenagh was acquitted on both counts.  Tadgell J delivering the leading 
judgment said on the question of relevance: 
 
Evidence of the applicant’s bad character, and in particular of his 
disposition to violence, was capable of being logically probative of 
the issue between Kavanagh and the Crown whether Kavenagh had 
driven his car as he had because he had been put in fear by what the 
applicant had said or done…The fact that the evidence was sought to 
be led against Kavenagh’s co-accused, to whom it would or might be 
prejudicial, was not a reason for excluding it.35 
 
VII THE JUDGE’S DIRECTIONS 
 
Sentiments similar to Mathers have been expressed again by the Privy 
Council in Lobban.36  In Bannon, 37 Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ 
characterised the judgment in Lobban in the following way: 
 
Their Lordships said that where the admission of evidence which was 
admissible against one defendant but not against his co-defendant 
resulted in a real risk of prejudice to the co-defendant, the judge 
should ensure that the interests of the co-defendant were protected by 
specific directions to the jury to the effect that the statement of one 
co-defendant was not evidence against the other or, in the last resort, 
by ordering separate trials.38 
 
                                                          
35 R v Mathers (1988) 38 A Crim R 423, 425-426. 
36 Lobban v The Queen [1995] 1 WLR 877. 
37 Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1. 
38 Bannon v The Queen at 23.  
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VIII GIVING EVIDENCE AGAINST ANOTHER 
 
The discussion so far has been concerned with the position which obtains 
when for a variety of reasons the evidence of criminal disposition is 
admissible only for or against the accused who puts that evidence before a 
jury.  Typically that occurs in what an accused has said out of court or at trial 
in an unsworn statement in the times when such statements were allowed.  In 
these circumstances that evidence was no part of the evidence against the 
accused whose disposition has been disparaged. 
 
There are other circumstances, however, when such evidence is admissible 
against the impugned accused.  The primary way in which that happens is 
where one accused gives sworn evidence part at least of which refers to the 
criminal disposition of the co-accused.  Where that position prevails there are 
a number of consequences.  One is that the accused giving evidence can be 
cross-examined on behalf of the co-accused about the accused’s own criminal 
disposition.  That entitlement derives from statute.39  In Victoria, South 
Australia and Northern Territory the accused giving evidence has to be 
‘charged with the same offence’.  In Queensland it suffices if the accused is 
‘charged in the same proceedings’.  Under the Uniform Evidence Acts leave is 
not to be given for cross-examination of one ‘defendant’ by another unless 
that evidence includes evidence adverse to that other and the evidence has 
been admitted. 
 
In Varley Kilner Brown J, showing a marked dislike of a comma, summarised 
in six propositions the principles on what is meant by the expression ‘has 
given evidence against’: 
 
1.  If it is established that a person jointly charged has given evidence 
against the co- defendant that defendant has the right to cross-examine 
the other as to prior convictions and the trial judge has no discretion 
to refuse an application.   
2. Such evidence may be given either in chief or during cross-
examination. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 15(2); WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 8(1)(c)(iii); NT: 
Evidence Act s 9(7)(c); Vic: Crimes Act 1958 s 399(5)(c); SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 
18(1)VI(c).  Much the same position obtains under the Uniform Evidence Acts 1995: 
Cth, and  NSW  s 104(6) and Tas Evidence Act 2001 s 104(5). 
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3. It has to be objectively decided whether the evidence either supports 
the prosecution case in a material respect or undermines the defence 
of the co-accused.  A hostile intent is irrelevant. 
4. If consideration has to be given to the undermining of the other’s 
defence care must be taken to see that that the evidence clearly 
undermines the defence.  Inconvenience to or inconsistency with the 
other’s defence is not of itself sufficient. 
5. Mere denial of participation in a joint venture is not of itself sufficient 
to rank as evidence against the co-defendant.  For the proviso…to 
apply, such denial must lead to the conclusion that if the witness did 
not participate then it must have been the other who did. 
6. Where the one defendant asserts or in due course would assert one 
view of the joint venture which is directly contradicted by the other 
such contradiction may be evidence against a co-defendant. 40  
 
Later cases have added a gloss.  On the fifth of Kilner Brown J’s six 
propositions in Varley the court said in Crawford41 that such denial may (not 
must) lead to the conclusion that if the witness did not participate then is must 
have been the other who did.  In South Australia the Court of Criminal Appeal 
held in Congressi42 that there were two types of evidence by one accused 
which could constitute the giving of evidence against the other.  The first was 
direct evidence and the second was evidence which undermined the defence 
of the other.  
 
‘Charged with the same offence’ is in the legislation of Victoria, South 
Australia and Northern Territory as we have seen, and with the exception of 
federal offences and the provisions in New South Wales and Tasmania, the 
other jurisdictions use ‘charged in the same proceedings’.  The phrase 
‘charged with the same offence’ does not seem to have been dealt with in 
Australia since 1918.43  In England in 1979 legislative amendments resulted in 
a change from ‘charged with the same offence’ to ‘charged in the same 
proceedings’.44  In the result some jurisdictions in Australia can key into 
decisions in England before the 1979 amendment, and some others into the 
post 1979 cases. 
 
 
                                                          
40 R v Varley (1982) 75 Cr App R 242, 246. 
41 R v Crawford [1997] 1 WLR 1329, 1335. 
42 R v Congressi  (1974) 9 SASR 257, 267. 
43 R v Malouf (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 142. 
44 Criminal Evidence Act 1898 s 1(f)(iii) amended by Criminal Evidence Act 1979 s 
1(1). 
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As to ‘the same offence’ the House of Lords reluctantly concluded that the 
words meant 
 
the same in all material respects including the time at which the 
offence is alleged to have been committed, and a distinct and separate 
offence similar in all respects to an offence committed later, no matter 
how short the interval between the two, cannot properly be regarded 
as ‘the same offence’.45 
 
The decision was in the following setting.  A van made a right turn to enter a 
factory.  Another car whose lane was crossed collided with the van and 
bounced off killing a pedestrian.  There was a joint trial with each driver on a 
count of causing death by dangerous driving.  The car driver gave evidence 
that the van turned in front of him giving neither time nor space to manoeuvre 
around it.  The trial judge allowed the car driver to be cross-examined by the 
van defendant to the fact that he had no licence, was unqualified to drive and 
had earlier similar convictions.  The Lords found that leave was wrongly 
given because the drivers had not been charged with ‘the same offence’ and 
struck down the conviction.  Earlier cases such as Lovett46 were called in aid 
of the cry for legislative change. 
 
IX JOINT OR SEPARATE TRIAL 
 
Courts have often said that where more than one accused are charged with 
committing a crime jointly, the presumption is that there should be a joint 
trial.  Where one accused intends to introduce evidence blaming the other 
there should still ordinarily be a joint trial.  In Middis Hunt J identified the 
circumstances when it was appropriate to order a separate trial.  His Honour 
said: 
 
 Briefly the relevant principles are that: 
1. where the evidence against an applicant for a separate trial is 
significantly weaker than and different to that admissible against 
the other accused to be jointly tried with him, and 
2. where the evidence against those other accused contains 
material highly prejudicial to the applicant though not 
admissible against him, and 
 
                                                          
45 Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis v Hills [1980] AC 26 at 34.  In fact the 
decision was handed down in mid-1978 and included a strong recommendation for 
the legislative amendment that was made the following year.   
46 R v Lovett [1973] 1 WLR 241. 
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3. where there is a real risk that the weaker Crown case against the 
applicant will be made immeasurably stronger by reason of the 
prejudicial material.47 
 
Other courts have approved these principles.48  A good example of failure to 
order a separate trial is O’Boyle.49  Two men were charged over the 
importation and supply of cocaine in England.  When Mr O’Boyle had been in 
USA he had been promised immunity if he told the police and other what had 
gone on.  He was promised that what he said would never be used.  The 
prosecutor at trial wanted to lead that evidence and the trial judge excluded it.  
Mr O’Boyle gave evidence.  The co-accused’s counsel cross-examined Mr 
O’Boyle and introduced that USA confession.  It went to the co-accused’s 
defence.  The Court allowed the appeal.  There should have been separate 
trials, they said.    
  
X DIRECTIONS TO THE JURY 
 
When a judge is summing up to a jury in any trial he must direct them on how 
to use the evidence.  In a joint trial the summing up must also include 
directions on what evidence is admissible and what is not admissible in the 
case against each accused.  If one accused introduces evidence of the criminal 
disposition of another careful directions must be given. 
 
Corak and Palmer was a joint trial on a charge of possession of indian hemp 
for trading.  The accused Mr Palmer gave evidence.  He was cross-examined 
on behalf of another accused that she acted as she did because of his duress. 
To that end he was taken to various other wrongdoings.  King CJ referred to 
Mr Palmer’s evidence and said: 
 
The evidence could properly be used by the jury as tending to support 
the evidence of duress and also in their assessment of the credibility 
of Palmer as a witness.  It could not properly be used as supporting 
the truth of the charge by way of its tendency to show a propensity on 
the part of Palmer to commit crime in general or to commit crime 
involving unlawful drugs in particular.  The admission of the 
evidence placed an obligation on the trial judge to give a direction to  
 
 
                                                          
47 R v Middis (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, No 70412 of 1990, 27 March 1991). 
48 R v McDonald & Ors (2002) 168 FLR 232, [56] (ACT, Gray J); R v Chami & 
Sheikh (2002) 128 A Crim R 428, [12] (NSW CCA). 
49 R v O’Boyle (1991) 92 Cr App R 202. 
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the jury as to the uses to which it could properly be put and as to the 
use which is impermissible.50   
 
Whether one accused who gives evidence of the criminal disposition of the 
other should be the subject of a warning to the jury has been a matter of some 
debate, particularly on whether an accomplice direction must be given.51  So it 
was that King CJ said: 
 
I consider that in the generality of cases in which an accused person 
gives evidence implicating a co-accused, it would be necessary, or at 
least desirable, to advise the jury to exercise caution in relying on that 
evidence alone to convict a co-accused because of the interests of his 
own which the implicating accused has to serve.52 
 
One obvious difficulty in the above proposition is that a jury should not be 
told of the interest of the accused in the outcome of the case.  To direct a jury 
in that way is to undermine the presumption of innocence.53 
 
Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ in Cheema pointed to the difficulties involved in 
giving a full corroboration warning: 
 
[T]he complication in requiring a judge to give full corroboration 
directions in respect of co-defendants implicating each other, would 
be likely to confuse and bewilder a jury.   Especially if there are 
several defendants, the difficulty of giving the full warning in relation 
to each, and identifying which pieces of evidence are capable of 
corroborating each of them, would create a minefield of difficulties.54 
 
The present law is to be found in Henning.  In that case the New South Wales 
Court of Criminal Appeal said: 
 
For whereas the standard form of corroboration warning, with all its 
complexities, may well be inappropriate or undesirable in relation to 
an accused who gives evidence inculpating a co-accused, there is one 
matter which must be stressed in all such cases where a warning is  
 
                                                          
50 R v Corak and Palmer (1982) 30 SASR 404, 413 (CCA).  
51 See the discussion by Mullighan J in R v Lawford  (1993) 61 SASR 542 (CCA). 
52 R v Webb and Hay (1992) 59 SASR 563, 584 (CCA). 
53 Robinson v The Queen  (1991) 180 CLR 531, 536: a joint judgment.  
54 R v Cheema [1994] 1 WLR 147, 156 (CCA) approved: Webb v The Queen (1994) 
181 CLR 41, 66 (Brennan J), 94 (Toohey J).  
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given.  It is essential in the interest of the accused who gives the 
evidence that the warning should be restricted in terms to those parts  
of the evidence which inculpate any co-accused.  It must be made 
clear to the jury that the warning is to be applied only when they are 
considering the case against the co-accused.  It must not be left open 
to them to believe that the warning might attach to the accused’s 
evidence in his own case.55 
  
Earlier the court had said that no inflexible rule should apply.56  And that was 
the conclusion reached by the High Court in Webb.57 
 
XI SEPARATE SUMMING UP BY JUDGE TO JURY 
 
You may think that the difficulties in a trial where one accused refers to the 
criminal disposition of another might be solved by a trial judge giving a 
separate summing up for each accused.  
 
In three cases at least trial judges in this country have summed up to the jury 
on each accused separately and then sent the jury out to consider their verdict 
for that accused.  Nelson J did it in Mitchell. 58  In that case there were ten 
accused on charges of conspiracy to defraud banks.  His Honour began by 
summing up generally and then particularly as to Mr Mitchell first, then the 
remaining accused in four groups.  That procedure was the first ground of 
appeal.  The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the trial judge had not acted 
improperly and dismissed that ground. 
 
In Annakin 59 the procedure adopted by Roden J was to direct generally then 
specifically on each accused.  His Honour then sent the jury out until they 
advised him that they were ready to go on with the summing up.  He did not 
take a verdict until the whole of the summing up was completed.  The ground 
of appeal failed that there should have been separate trials and that Roden J’s 
procedure was flawed. 
 
In McPhail 60 the trial judge, Judge Cooper, adopted the same procedure as 
had Roden J in Annakin in that he gave a general summing up followed by a  
 
                                                          
55 R v Henning (11 May 1990, NSW CCA, unreported) 49. 
56 R v Henning at 47.  
57 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41. 
58 R v Mitchell [1971] VR 46, 48-54. 
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particular summing up and then without taking a verdict for that accused 
giving the jury a break.  He then began his summing up on the next accused.  
The real vice was not so much in the procedure but in the directions 
themselves, for the trial judge told the jury that they could take into account 
any matter which in their opinion could be relevant to the case of a former 
accused.  As you can imagine, in a case of twelve accused in a trial lasting 
more than seven and a half months, a good deal of evidence admissible 
against one accused was not admissible against another.  The ground of 
appeal on the failure to give proper directions succeeded. 
 
The reason why there will be a difficulty in giving separate directions in a trial 
where one accused introduces the criminal disposition of another is addressed 
directly in Wooding.61  In that case nine accused were charged on one 
indictment containing seven counts.  The essence of the charges was a 
conspiracy to obtain money by deception involving frauds on the international 
financial market, and various of the substantive offences used to carry out the 
scheme.  The accused had made statements minimising their own 
participation and inculpating others: the cut throat defence. Some of the 
accused gave sworn evidence.  The trial judge summed up generally and then 
on each accused separately.  He then took a verdict on that accused before 
starting his summing up on the next.  All appeals succeeded.  Lawton LJ, 
delivering the judgment of the court, said: 
 
Separate summings up, in our judgment, are inappropriate and likely 
to lead to unfairness when the jury’s verdicts against earlier 
defendants in the indictment may – despite the most careful direction 
– make it difficult for the jury fairly to review the evidence of a 
witness who has already been believed when considering that of a 
later defendant who has alleged that the witness should not be 
believed.  The likely unfairness stands out for all to see if there is a 
divided summing up in a case where a number of defendants have put 
forward ‘cut throat’ defences.62 
 
In McPhail, Lee CJ at CL, delivering the judgment with which the other 
members of the court agreed, approved the above passage in Wooding.63  
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XII DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE 
 
The discretion to exclude such evidence has been discussed in the earlier 
comments on the cases.  The current state of Australian law is that a judge has 
the discretion to exclude such evidence.  In Gibb and McKenzie, the Victorian 
Court of Criminal Appeal said in a joint judgment: 
 
 
A trial judge, however, retains a discretion to exclude such evidence 
in a proper case.  But such an exercise of discretion will necessarily 
be rare.  It is not to be exercised simply because one accused wishes 
to elicit evidence of the bad character of another accused. 64 
 
Later the judges explained that a trial judge always has to ensure that the trial 
is fairly and properly conducted.  This duty will sometimes involve ensuring 
that the freedom granted to accused persons is not abused. 65  
 
That seems to be the law that has stood the test of time in Australia.  There is 
good reason for it.  In the murder case with which the court was considering, a 
judge would and should have excluded evidence, say, that Mr Gibb had a 
handful of parking infringements.  The proposed evidence must tend to prove 
or disprove a fact in issue or a fact relevant to a fact in issue.66  If the 
probative value of the evidence is so low as not to justify the time, 
convenience and cost of its proof, the evidence should be excluded in the 
exercise of discretion. 67 
 
XIII CONCLUSION 
 
Trials of serious offences are almost invariably trials by jury.  But not even 
appeal courts assume that the decisions of a jury will be ‘unaffected by 
matters of possible prejudice’.68  It may be only an atmosphere but that alone 
can be palpable enough.  In Torney the court said: 
 
Unfortunately, the atmosphere built up in a trial of this kind 
sometimes creates an added element of general prejudice against a  
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particular accused: indeed it is not altogether an unexpected 
happening, it is a foreseeable incidence of a joint trial.69 
 
In many joint trials an accused will introduce evidence of the convictions 
and generally of the criminal disposition and propensity of the co-accused.  
That evidence may be based on first hand knowledge or on belief or even on 
rumour.  Courts have held that evidence of the criminal disposition of the 
co-accused unknown to the accused at the time of the offence is 
admissible.70 
 
In Demirok the court said in a joint judgment: 
 
Essentially, an accused man is entitled to a trial conducted in 
accordance with the relevant rules, the objects of which include 
ensuring that the evidence tendered against him is admissible against 
him and that he is not exposed to prejudice by the introduction against 
him of material which is irrelevant or, in some situations, only 
marginally relevant.71 
 
Put more generally, an accused has a right to a fair trial or rather, as Deane J 
said, ‘a right not to be tried unfairly’.72 
 
Prosecutors are under an ethical duty requiring fairness to any accused.  No 
such constraints apply to counsel for one accused who seeks to blame another 
accused.  Rather the plain duty of such counsel both to his client and to the 
court is to conduct the trial so as to achieve a favourable result for the accused 
for whom that counsel acts.73  It means that where there is a joint trial in 
which one accused blames the other or where the defences are cut throat, one 
of the functions of the defence will be to introduce as much material as 
possible to establish that defence. 
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